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Constitutional Cases 2008:
An Overview
Patrick J. Monahan and James Yap*

I. INTRODUCTION
This volume of the Supreme Court Law Review, which consists of
papers presented at Osgoode Hall Law School‟s 12th Annual
Constitutional Cases Conference held on April 17, 2009, examines the
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada released in the
calendar year 2008.1 The Court handed down a total of 74 judgments in
2008,2 just 12 (or 16 per cent) of which were constitutional cases. The
majority of the constitutional cases (10 of 12 cases) were Charter cases,3
while the remaining two cases dealt with federalism issues.4 In no case
released during calendar 2008 did the Court decide an Aboriginal
constitutional issue.5

*
Patrick J. Monahan is Vice-President Academic and Provost of York University. James
Yap is a student in the J.D. program at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1
A case is defined as a “constitutional case” if the decision of the Court involves the
interpretation or application of a provision of the “Constitution of Canada”, as defined in s. 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Supreme Court of Canada, Bulletin of Proceedings: Special Edition, Statistics 19982008, available online at <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/stat/html/index-eng.asp>.
3
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Khadr”]; Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] S.C.J. No. 39,
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui II”]; Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice),
[2008] S.C.J. No. 23, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lake”]; R. v. M. (A.), [2008] S.C.J.
No. 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “M. (A.)”]; R. v. B. (D.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 25,
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B. (D.)”]; R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, [2008] 1
S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Kang-Brown”]; R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Kapp”]; R. v. Wittwer, [2008] S.C.J. No. 33, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 235 (S.C.C.); Société des
Acadiens et Acadiennes du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Canada, [2008] S.C.J. No. 15, [2008] 1
S.C.R. 383 (S.C.C.). Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of The Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
620 Connaught Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] S.C.J. No. 7, [2008] 1 S.C.R.
131 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “620 Connaught”]; Confédération des syndicats nationaux v. Canada
(Attorney General), [2008] S.C.J. No. 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CSN”].
5
In Kapp, supra, note 3, Bastarache J. wrote a lone concurring opinion in which he took
into account s. 25 of the Charter. The majority, however, did not rule on the s. 25 issue.
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Of the 10 Charter cases, seven were unanimous, while both
federalism cases were unanimous. Despite the unusually low number of
constitutional judgments released, several of these decisions were
potentially highly significant. This significance is reflected in the
generally high success rate for constitutional claims — Charter claims
were successful in seven of 10 cases, and federalism claims succeeded in
one of two cases.
The 2008 term also saw a return to a number of statistical trends
from which the Court had strayed in 2007. The 2007 term had revealed a
Court that was more divided and saw a significant dip in both the number
of appeals heard and the number of judgments released. This past year,
however, saw a return to the general statistical trends established by the
McLachlin Court in all these categories. In 2008, the Court was
unanimous in 76 per cent of cases, matching the McLachlin Court
average, whereas in 2007 it had been unanimous in only 62 per cent of
cases. The Court also heard 82 appeals in 2008 (as opposed to 53 in
2007), close to the McLachlin Court yearly average of 80; and it also
issued 74 appeal judgments (58 in 2007), approaching the McLachlin
Court yearly average of 82.
In retrospect, therefore, 2007 appears to have been a statistical
anomaly.

II. CHARTER CASES
The Court was particularly receptive to Charter claims in 2008.
Seven of 10 cases (70 per cent) succeeded, the highest success rate since
1985.6 In contrast, since McLachlin J. was elevated to Chief Justice on
January 7, 2000, Charter claimants have been successful in 57 out of 124
cases (46 per cent). However, if 2008 is counted together with 2007,
where Charter claimants were successful in just three of 12 cases (25 per
cent), then the two-year success rate works out to 45 per cent —
consistent with the McLachlin Court average. So it seems yet another
downward trend from 2007 was balanced out in 2008.

6
A Charter claim is treated as being successful when the claimant receives some form of
relief under s. 24 of the Charter, or where a statute or other legal rule is declared to be inconsistent
with the Constitution of Canada under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
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1. Equality Rights — R. v. Kapp
Kapp is the most significant equality rights decision since Law v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)7 almost a decade
earlier. In August 1998, a group of mainly non-Aboriginal commercial
fishers staged a protest fishery at the mouth of the Fraser River during a
special 24-hour period reserved for Aboriginal fishers designated by their
bands under a communal fishing licence. This communally held licence,
which authorized three Aboriginal bands to grant use of the licence to
designated individual band members, was issued as part of a federal
program introduced in 1992, after the Supreme Court of Canada‟s
decision in R. v. Sparrow.8 When, as anticipated, the protest fishers were
charged with fishing at a prohibited time, they sought declarations that
the communal fishing licence and related regulations and policies were
unconstitutional under section 15(1) of the Charter.
Although they were initially successful in Provincial Court, the
British Columbia Supreme Court allowed the Crown‟s appeal and
entered a conviction, which was subsequently upheld by the Court of
Appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court
unanimously dismissed the appeal in two separate concurring opinions.
Notably, an eight-member majority led by the Chief Justice and Abella J.
upheld the impugned government action under section 15(2). In doing so,
they not only clarified the interpretation and operation of section 15(2),
they also took the opportunity to fundamentally restructure the proper
analytical approach to section 15(1).
In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia,9 the Court had
identified two chief indicators of discrimination under section 15(1):
perpetuating pre-existing disadvantage and stereotyping. A decade later,
in Law, the Court suggested instead that the analysis of discrimination
could be framed in terms of impact on the claimant‟s “human dignity”,
having regard to four contextual factors: (1) pre-existing disadvantage;
(2) the relationship between the differential treatment and the claimant
group‟s reality; (3) any ameliorative purpose or effects; and (4) the
nature of the interest affected.
In Kapp, however, the Court observed that this approach has led to
considerable difficulties. For instance, the majority acknowledged
criticism that human dignity, the touchstone from Law, is an “abstract
7
8
9

[1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.).
[1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.).
[1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).
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and subjective notion”10 and difficult to apply as a legal test. Further,
they noted that it has imposed an additional burden on claimants, and
moreover has sometimes led to an overly formalistic approach “in the
form of an artificial comparator analysis focussed on treating likes
alike”.11 It is thus more appropriate, they stressed, to conceive of Law as
an affirmation of the approach to substantive equality set out in Andrews,
rather than as the formulation of a new and distinctive legal test under
section 15(1).
Accordingly, the four contextual factors cited in Law as indicators of
human dignity “should not be read literally as if they were legislative
dispositions, but as a way of focussing on the central concern of s. 15
identified in Andrews — combating discrimination”, defined through the
dual concepts of (1) perpetuating disadvantage or prejudice; and (2)
imposing disadvantage on the basis of stereotyping.12
Thus, the Court has effectively discarded the concept of “human
dignity” introduced in Law, re-affirming the primacy of the Andrews test.
Meanwhile, the majority judgment of the Chief Justice and Abella J.
also brought much-needed clarification to section 15(2). They noted the
complementary roles of subsections 15(1) and 15(2) in achieving the
central purpose of combating discrimination: section 15(1) prevents
governments from making distinctions on enumerated or analogous
grounds that promote or perpetuate discrimination, while section 15(2)
enables governments to enact measures to proactively combat existing
discrimination. Thus, they reasoned, section 15(2) should be seen neither
as an interpretive aid to section 15(1) (as the Court had previously, albeit
tentatively, held in Lovelace v. Ontario13), nor as an exception to its
operation, but as an independently operative complement. Specifically,
the government may elide altogether the necessity to conduct a section
15(1) analysis by demonstrating that an impugned program meets the
criteria of section 15(2). In other words, if a section 15 claimant shows
that there has been a distinction made on an enumerated or analogous
ground, section 15(2) allows the government to show that the impugned
law, program or activity is ameliorative and, thus, constitutional —
10

Kapp, supra, note 3, at para. 22.
Id.
Id., at paras. 24 and 25.
13
[2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.). There, Iacobucci J. emphasized that
“I do not foreclose the possibility that s. 15(2) may be independently applicable to a case in the
future” (at para. 100) and “we may well wish to reconsider this matter at a future time in the context
of another case” (at para. 108).
11
12

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)
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regardless of the section 15(1) analysis. In this way, subsections 15(1)
and 15(2) “work together to promote the vision of substantive equality
that underlies s. 15 as a whole”.14 This approach also avoids “the
symbolic problem of finding a program discriminatory before „saving‟ it
as ameliorative”.15
With respect to the actual criteria of section 15(2), the Court chose to
adopt a deferential purpose-based test. A program does not violate the
section 15 equality guarantee if the government can demonstrate that: (1)
the program has an ameliorative or remedial purpose; and (2) the
program targets a disadvantaged group identified by the enumerated or
analogous grounds. As the actual language of section 15(2) suggests, it is
the legislative purpose rather than the actual effect of the program that is
the paramount consideration. Thus, the government need not demonstrate
any actual ameliorative effect. However, neither can the government
invoke the protection of this provision simply by issuing a bald
declaration that a particular program has an ameliorative purpose — this
purpose must also clear a “rationality” hurdle. That is, the reviewing
court must also be satisfied that it is rational for the state to conclude that
the means chosen to reach its ameliorative goal would contribute to that
purpose.
Justice Bastarache, issuing a lone concurring opinion, endorsed the
majority‟s reformulation of the section 15 analysis, but would have
disposed of the appeal entirely on the basis of section 25 instead.
Kapp is a welcome clarification and simplification of equality law. It
eliminates “human dignity” as a legal test and avoids a “checklist”
approach to the Law analysis, opting instead for a principle-based
approach anchored in the central purpose of section 15 — combating
discrimination in the form of perpetuating pre-existing disadvantage or
stereotyping.
Additionally, the new test should also put to rest speculation that
surfaced in the 1990s that only traditionally disadvantaged groups could
bring claims under section 15. The Andrews test clearly identifies
stereotyping as one of the twin branches of discrimination, along with
pre-existing disadvantage. Stereotyping is something that may occur in
the absence of a pre-existing disadvantage. Thus, there is no reason to
suggest that only traditionally disadvantaged groups can bring equality
claims, as groups that cannot lay claim to a pre-existing disadvantage
14
15

Kapp, supra, note 3, at para. 16.
Id., at para. 40.
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may still allege discrimination on the grounds of stereotyping. The
government could, of course, still foreclose this claim under section
15(2) by demonstrating a proper ameliorative purpose.
2. Sniffer-Dog Cases
The Court also decided two important section 8 cases dealing with
sniffer-dog searches: R. v. Kang-Brown and the companion case of R. v.
M. (A.). These cases raised the question of what grounds the police
require before they are “authorized by law” to conduct a sniffer-dog
search. The Court voted to exclude the evidence in both cases, but ruled
that the police may lawfully conduct sniffer-dog searches for drugs on
the basis of a “reasonable suspicion”. However, the Court was badly split
in these decisions and longer-term implications for the use of dogs for
drug searches remain unclear.
In Kang-Brown, an undercover Royal Canadian Mounted Police
officer was staking out a bus terminal when a passenger alighting from a
bus aroused his suspicion by engaging him in an “elongated stare”. The
officer subsequently engaged the passenger in conversation and asked
permission to see his bag. The passenger agreed and knelt down to show
the contents of his bag. The officer then reached his hand out to actually
take hold of the bag, and as he did so the passenger pulled the bag away
and became agitated, at which point the officer signalled another officer
who was accompanied by a dog. As the dog approached, it immediately
indicated the presence of drugs to its handler.
In M. (A.), Sarnia police accepted a standing invitation from a high
school principal to bring sniffer dogs to search the school whenever they
wished. As the police searched the school, students were instructed by
the principal to remain in their classrooms to maintain order. During the
course of the search, drugs were found in a backpack belonging to the
accused which was lying unattended in the school gymnasium.
In both these cases, the key issue to be settled was whether and in
what circumstances the police have a common law power to conduct a
warrantless sniffer-dog search. In the test set out in R. v. Collins,16 one of
the constitutional requirements for a warrantless search is that it be
authorized by law. As no statute has as of yet been enacted to govern the
use of sniffer dogs by police, the question became whether a warrantless
sniffer-dog search was authorized at common law.
16

[1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
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Justice LeBel, joined by Fish, Abella and Charron JJ. in both cases,
voted to retain the existing common law standard of “reasonable and
probable grounds” to determine the lawfulness of any police search,
including sniffer-dog searches. They demurred from creating a specialized
common law framework governing the use of sniffer dogs, deeming it a
matter more appropriately addressed by the legislature. Accordingly,
they found that both searches were conducted in violation of section 8 of
the Charter and voted to exclude the evidence.
Justice Binnie, joined by the Chief Justice in both cases, argued that
because the practice of using sniffer dogs in Canada had become so
widespread and well established, leaving the matter to Parliament “ducks
a practical and immediate problem facing law enforcement”.17 Noting the
Court‟s obligation to adjust the common law incrementally as needed, he
reasoned that imposing a “reasonable and probable grounds” requirement
on sniffer-dog searches for drugs would render sniffer dogs superfluous
and unnecessary, as in such circumstances the police would ostensibly
have grounds to obtain an actual search warrant. Thus, he concluded that
the police are authorized at common law to conduct a warrantless snifferdog search for drugs on the basis of a “reasonable suspicion”. Applying
this standard, however, he found in both cases that the searches were
conducted in the absence of “reasonable suspicion” and were therefore
unreasonable. Like LeBel J., he voted in both cases to exclude the
evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.
Justice Deschamps dissented in the disposition of both cases, and
was joined each time in her reasons by Rothstein J. In Kang-Brown,
however, she endorsed Binnie J.‟s articulation of the standard applicable
to warrantless sniffer-dog searches for drugs as one of reasonable
suspicion. However, she took issue with Binnie J.‟s application of the
standard, arguing that his interpretation of reasonable suspicion sets the
evidentiary requirements
so high that this standard is equivalent to that of reasonable grounds to
believe, and is accordingly redundant. … I cannot imagine a fact
situation that would, on Binnie J.‟s analysis, while satisfying the
evidentiary requirements for reasonable suspicion, fail to satisfy the
requirements for reasonable grounds to believe. 18

She found that the police did properly search the accused‟s bag on the
basis of a reasonable suspicion, and would have admitted the evidence.
17
18

Kang-Brown, supra, note 3, at para. 21.
Id., at para. 205.
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In M. (A.), Deschamps J. found that the claim did not clear the
threshold section 8 requirement of reasonable expectation of privacy, due
to circumstances such as the controlled environment of a school‟s
property, the school‟s drug problem, the fact that the backpack was
unattended and in plain view, and the minimal intrusiveness of the
search. She therefore found no violation of section 8 in that case and
would have admitted the evidence accordingly.
Finally, Bastarache J. also endorsed the standard of reasonable
suspicion championed by his four colleagues, but went even further. He
found that a reasonable suspicion need not attach to an individual, but
may also attach to a particular activity or location. For instance, he
wrote, there is an “ongoing reasonable suspicion about drug activity
occurring at this country‟s airports and bus and train depots”.19 Thus, the
police may conduct a sniffer-dog search for drugs on the basis of such a
“generalized suspicion”. Accordingly, in Kang-Brown, Bastarache J.
found that the police properly conducted their search on the basis of an
individualized suspicion, but it would have been equally permissible for
them to have performed the search on the basis of a generalized suspicion.
In M. (A.), conversely, Bastarache J. found that the police had no
basis for a reasonable individualized suspicion, and neither did a
generalized suspicion attach to the school. He would nevertheless have
admitted the evidence on the grounds that doing so would not bring the
administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2).
Clearly, these cases caused deep divisions within the Court. In the
final tally, the Court voted 6-3 to exclude the evidence in both cases, but
voted 5-4 to establish a common law police power to conduct sniffer-dog
searches for drugs on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, with Binnie J.
and the Chief Justice casting the swing votes either way.
There was, moreover, deep disagreement as to how the standard of
reasonable suspicion should be applied. There appeared to be some
consensus that reasonable suspicion entails some tangible, objectively
ascertainable facts to support an expectation that an individual is possibly
engaged in criminal activity. However, that is where all agreement ended
— the indeterminacy of the reasonable suspicion standard was reflected
in the different ways it was applied. Justice Binnie found that the
standard was not met in either case, Deschamps J. found that it was met
in Kang-Brown and unnecessary to apply in M. (A.), and Bastarache J.
found that it was met in Kang-Brown but not met in M. (A.). Furthermore,
19

M. (A.), supra, note 3, at para. 173.
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Deschamps J. sharply criticized Binnie J.‟s application of the standard,
declaring it to be so strict as to essentially conflate reasonable suspicion
with reasonable and probable grounds.
A further complication is that the standard may shift depending on
the abilities of the individual sniffer dog in question. As LeBel J.
observed in his reasons in Kang-Brown,
the record remains singularly bereft of useful information about sniffer
dogs. The available information is in essence limited to the facts that
they are used for investigative purposes in a variety of circumstances
and that police officers believe in their overall reliability and to the
praise of a particular dog deployed at the Calgary bus station. 20

As such, Binnie J. acknowledged that the reasonableness of a sniffer-dog
search will depend on the track record of the individual animal in
question, noting that
dogs, being living creatures, exhibit individual capacities that vary from
animal to animal. While a false positive may be rare for [the sniffer dog
in M. (A.)], it is not thus with all dogs. The importance of proper tests
and records of particular dogs will be an important element in
establishing the reasonableness of a particular sniffer-dog search.21

This adds additional uncertainty to the standard with respect to snifferdog searches.
As such, the sniffer-dog cases may well induce further litigation in
an attempt to resolve this indeterminacy and define the applicable
standard more concretely. These cases also establish that any judicial or
common law standard is likely to prove problematic in practice and,
accordingly, there is a clear need for Parliament to step in and establish a
legislative framework for the use of sniffer dogs. The first difficulty is
that the Court is badly divided on the applicable legal and constitutional
standard that should govern the use of sniffer dogs. Moreover, even
where members of the Court agree on the legal standard to be applied,
they are likely to disagree on the application of that standard to the facts
of a particular case. This indicates that in future litigation, counsel and
lower courts will have extreme difficulty in developing and consistently
applying a test for the use of sniffer dogs. Only legislative action by
Parliament will be able to supply the consistency and predictability
needed for the use of this important law enforcement tool.
20
21

Kang-Brown, supra, note 3, at para. 15.
M. (A.), supra, note 3, at para. 84.
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3. Canada in the Global Community
Three cases decided in 2008 — Khadr, Lake and Charkaoui II —
raised the issue of Canada‟s role internationally. The most significant of
these was Khadr, where the Court sharply restricted the effect of the
ruling in R. v. Hape,22 handed down just one year earlier.
Omar Khadr, a Canadian detainee at the controversial U.S. detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay, had been interviewed by Canadian Security
Intelligence (“CSIS”) agents at the facility and subsequently applied
under section 7 for disclosure of the records of those interviews, which
had been shared with U.S. authorities.
The government argued that the Charter did not apply to the conduct
of Canadian agents operating outside Canada, relying on the ruling in
Hape. In Hape, the Court had stated that, as a general principle, the
Charter cannot apply to govern the actions of Canadian state actors in
matters that fall (as the facts of Khadr did) within the exclusive territorial
jurisdiction of another sovereign state.
The Court had also speculated, however, that Canadian state actors
may nevertheless be prohibited under the Charter from participating in
activities sanctioned by foreign law where such participation would place
Canada in violation of its international human rights obligations.
In Khadr, the Court seized on these remarks to open a narrow
exception to the rule in Hape. Noting that the United States Supreme
Court had already ruled that circumstances surrounding the Guantanamo
Bay process violated both the Geneva Conventions 23 and the
internationally protected right of habeas corpus,24 the Court found that
Canada‟s participation in the process would indeed place it in breach of
its binding international obligations. Thus, when government officials
shared records of the interviews with U.S. officials, thereby becoming
participants in the process, they became bound by the Charter.
Accordingly, they came under an obligation to disclose the records to

22

[2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.).
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Can. T.S. 1965 No. 20 [“First Geneva Convention”];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, Can. T.S. 1965 No. 20 [“Second Geneva
Convention”]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, Can. T.S. 1965 No. 20 [“Third Geneva Convention”]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Can. T.S. 1965 No. 20 [“Fourth Geneva
Convention”].
24
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
23

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)
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Mr. Khadr in order to “mitigate the effect of Canada‟s participation”25 in
a process that violated Canada‟s international obligations.
In many ways, it is surprising for the Court to have significantly
narrowed its ruling in Hape so soon after its release. This may reflect
lingering discomfort within the Court over what had been a somewhat
contentious point.26 However, it would still be grossly premature to begin
eulogizing Hape at this juncture. Recently, the Court denied leave to
appeal in the case of Amnesty International Canada v. Canada
(Canadian Forces),27 in which the Federal Court of Appeal had applied
Hape to rule that the Charter does not apply to Canadian Forces in
Afghanistan in respect of the treatment of prisoners of war and other
detainees. Specifically, Desjardins J.A. observed that Khadr does not
signal that the Charter applies automatically if there has been a breach of
international human rights law — rather, “all the circumstances in a
given situation must be examined before it can be said that the Charter
applies”.28 Thus, the ruling in Hape clearly remains very much alive and
well.
Another effect of the Khadr decision is that it also firmly entrenches
the role of international human rights law in Charter litigation. Before,
international human rights law was mainly relevant to Charter litigation
merely as an interpretive aid29 — interesting and persuasive, but not
necessarily instrumental to the outcome. Now, international human rights
law has become a central element in Charter litigation involving
Canadian officials acting abroad. Canadian lawyers contemplating such

25

Khadr, supra, note 3, at para. 34.
In Hape, supra, note 22, four members of the Court concurred in the disposition of the
majority but distanced themselves from the broad constitutional pronouncements in LeBel J.‟s
opinion. Notably, Binnie J. wrote a brief set of reasons in which he protested that the case did not
afford “a proper springboard for such sweeping conclusions” (at para. 182). See Patrick Monahan &
James Gotowiec, “Constitutional Cases 2007: An Overview” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at 12-14.
27
[2008] F.C.J. No. 1700, 385 D.L.R. (4th) 741 (Fed. C.A.). Interestingly, Binnie J. in his
dissent in Hape had referenced this litigation, pending before the Federal Court at the time, to sound
a warning that the majority pronouncements in Hape would prematurely foreclose arguments in
other cases that may come before the Court.
28
Id., at para. 20.
29
See, for instance, Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989]
1 S.C.R. 1038, at 1056-57 (S.C.C.), where the majority stated the principle that “the Charter should
generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in
international human rights documents which Canada has ratified”. This principle was recently reaffirmed and applied by the Court in Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining
Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391, at para. 70 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Health Services”].
26

14

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)

claims may very well now be required to familiarize themselves with
international human rights law.
Coming in somewhat of a contrast to Khadr, meanwhile, was the
Court‟s ruling in Lake. There, the Court adopted a deferential standard of
review in upholding the Minister of Justice‟s decision that a Canadian
citizen‟s extradition does not violate the Charter, citing the Minister‟s
superior expertise with respect to Canada‟s international obligations and
relationships with foreign governments. This is notable because the
office of Minister, of course, is not of a juridical but a political nature,
sensitive to political interests and considerations. To entrust such an
actor with legal determinations as paramount as an individual‟s Charter
rights signals the Court‟s unwavering commitment to affording the
executive substantial unfettered discretion in the realm of interstate
cooperation, the adverse ruling in Khadr notwithstanding.
In Charkaoui II, meanwhile, the Court held that section 7 imposes
upon CSIS a duty to retain and disclose notes from interviews conducted
with the claimant, in the course of proceedings relating to the security
certificate issued against him under section 77(1) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act.30 CSIS had provided mere summaries of the
interviews and had tried to argue that the notes could not be disclosed as
they had been destroyed pursuant to CSIS internal policy. However, the
Court ruled that these summaries were not sufficient, and that the
destruction of the operational notes was a breach of both section 12 of
the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Act31 and of the duty of
procedural fairness under section 7 of the Charter.
4. Young Offenders
Finally, the Court also had occasion to decide an important case with
respect to young offenders. B. (D.) struck down certain sentencing
provisions under the Youth Criminal Justice Act,32 whereby youths
convicted of certain serious offences would automatically receive an
adult sentence, unless they could show they should receive a youth
sentence. The Court split 5-4 in the disposition of the case, but was
unanimous in holding that the presumption of diminished moral
blameworthiness of children is a principle of fundamental justice.
30
31
32
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III. FEDERALISM CASES
Just two federalism cases were handed down in 2008. The most
significant of these was CSN, which adopted an expansive interpretation
of Parliament‟s power in relation to unemployment insurance, under
section 91(2A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.33 This was significant since
it meant that various “active measures” in the Employment Insurance
Act,34 such as an employment service, training, work-sharing programs,
wage subsidies and job creation partnerships, were also all valid. In a
judgment written by LeBel J., the Court unanimously affirmed that the
unemployment insurance power must be interpreted generously, and not
limited to simply taking passive responsibility for paying benefits to
Canadian workers during periods where they are not working. This
generous interpretation is essentially another illustration of the Court‟s
“living tree” doctrine, originally formulated in Edwards v. Canada
(Attorney General),35 which requires that the Constitution be interpreted
as an organic document that must be adapted to changing circumstances
and needs.
The Court in CSN also held that provisions in the Act delegating to
the Governor in Council the power to set employment insurance
premiums for certain years were, in effect, an attempt to delegate the
power to tax without expressly so providing. Thus, the provisions were
inconsistent with section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which
provides that the power to tax may only be delegated expressly.36
However, the Court suspended its declaration of invalidity in relation to
these provisions for 12 months, and Parliament should be able to enact
remedial legislation that will retroactively authorize the collection of the
premiums in question.
The other federalism case decided in 2008 also dealt with the
application of section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. In 620 Connaught,
an alcohol licensing levy imposed by the Minister of Canadian Heritage
was found to be in pith and substance a regulatory charge and a valid
exercise of federal jurisdiction over national parks under section 92(1A).
It was not, therefore, a tax and there was no inconsistency with the
requirements of section 53.

33
34
35
36
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IV. VOTING PATTERNS
In 2008, the judges were unanimous in nine of 12, or 75 per cent, of
the constitutional cases they heard. All three of the dissents occurred in
Charter cases. Two of these cases were actually the companion cases of
M. (A.) and Kang-Brown, where the Court split along identical lines.
Justices Bastarache, Deschamps and Rothstein dissented in the
disposition of both these cases, and the same three judges dissented once
again in B. (D.), this time joined by Charron J. All of these dissents were
issued in criminal cases, and all three went against the Charter claimant.
Justices Bastarache, Deschamps, and Rothstein thus cast three
dissenting votes each in 2008, while Charron J. cast one. The Chief
Justice and Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Abella JJ. had no dissents.
This is in stark contrast to 2007, where it was Binnie, LeBel and Fish
JJ. who were the most active dissenters at three each, with Abella J.
weighing in at two. Justices Bastarache, Charron and Rothstein,
meanwhile, had no dissents, while the Chief Justice and Deschamps J.
had one each. In 2007, all dissenting votes cast went in favour of the
Charter claimant, except for Deschamps J.‟s opinion in Health Services.37

V. CONCLUSION
Overall, the Court has shown that it is not too timid to boldly revisit
legal principles that it had recently settled if it sees a need to do so (see
Kapp and Khadr). It also demonstrates a continued willingness to subject
law enforcement activities to indeterminate legal tests (see M. (A.) and
Kang-Brown, the sniffer-dog cases), which may well produce further
work for the Court in future.
Further, although the Court showed great deference to government in
cases like Lake and CSN, they also displayed in B. (D.) that they remain
perfectly capable of being assertive in relation to Parliament where
necessary.
The dying days of 2008 also saw the appointment of a new Puisne
Justice, Thomas Albert Cromwell, formerly of the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal, who replaces the now-retired Bastarache J. This appointment
came in the midst of the swirling political drama that gripped the nation
at the end of 2008. In the spring of 2008, Bastarache J. had unexpectedly
announced his retirement from the Court and, in September, the Prime
37
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Minister nominated Cromwell J.A. from the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal as his putative replacement. Initially, the Conservative
government intended to confirm the nomination through the rigorous
consultative process (involving public questioning by Members of
Parliament) that it had adopted for Rothstein J.‟s appointment.38
However, in the midst of a constitutional crisis and facing a serious
threat to its survival, the Conservative government elected to cut short
the consultative process and quietly push the nomination through, rather
than risk being toppled from power before it could consummate the
nomination. Despite the surrounding circumstances, however, the
appointment itself did not arouse any particular controversy.
The retirement of Bastarache J. signals the departure of a member of
the Court who had taken a quite distinctive approach to constitutional
interpretation in general and Charter interpretation in particular. Justice
Bastarache was a strong proponent of the language rights provisions in
the Charter and had also written a variety of judgments over the years
taking an expansive approach in certain cases involving fundamental
freedoms under section 2. In contrast, Bastarache J. had tended to adopt a
somewhat narrower approach in the interpretation of the legal rights
provisions in sections 7 to 14, allowing governments and particularly law
enforcement agencies greater room for manoeuvre. His departure and the
appointment of Cromwell J. may well prove important to the overall
philosophy and direction of the Court in the years ahead.

38

See <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/scc-csc.html>.

